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In The Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
HARVEY A. SJOSTROM, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THERAL V. BISHOP and 
ROSS L. COVINGTON, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 10054 
Reply Brief of Petitioner 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. REPLY TO RESPONDENTS POINT 1 
"THAT REMEDY IS NOT A WRIT OF RIGHT BUT IS 
ADDRESSED TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE 
COURT." 
In point 1 of respondent's brief, respondents say that 
the extraordinary remedy is not a writ of right, but is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the court and quote 
an Idaho case in support of that proposition as well as 7 4 
C.J.S. 184. Respondents further say that it is not hard 
to imagine great public inconvenience and confusion that 
would ensue should respondents be ousted. But they do 
not point out in what manner the public would be harmed 
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and they cannot do so. Do they mean to say that we 
have in this case two indispensable officers and that unless 
they are retained the people of Logan will suffer even 
though they are usurpers. But even though it is conceded 
(for the purpose of argument only and not admitting the 
same ) that there would be some confusion, that is no 
ground that can be considered by this court to ignore 
10-6-18. In 59 Corpus Juris pp. 968, Sec. 574, it is said 
"as courts are not at liberty to construe a statute when the 
language is plain, but must give effect to the legislative 
intent as expressed by the language, it follows that where 
the language adequately expresses the intention of the 
legislature, it must be given effect regardless of the con-
sequence, and the fact that such effect cause hardship, 
or inconvenience, or even injustice, or will render another 
statute redundant cannot be considered by the Court." 
What the respondents are really asking, is for this Court 
to refuse to uphold a most positive and mandatory law. 
They further say under this point that the public has no 
interest in this action. In this they are mistaken for the 
public has great interest in upholding the law as should 
the individual and if the public should ever become in-
different in so doing, our nation as we know it today 
would not long survive. 
It seems to petitioner that the authority to file this 
petition was given on the 19th day of January, 1964, and 
it was on that day that the petition was filed. If we are 
right in this then the merits of the case are before this 
Court. Counsel says that we have elected or appointed 
officers to look after the interest of the public. Public 
officers, however well intentioned, are not immune from 
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ovl'rsight, mistake or prejudice and therefore (b) ( 1) 
undt·r Rule 6.5 B. 
But what is "sound discretion." Sound discretion is 
discrt'tion as settled by ntles, otherwise it is sound only 
wht>n the court decides as the party seeking the decision 
wants, and hence in practice it will come to mean a notion, 
whim or caprice of the judge who exercise it. So holds 
the court in the case of Margaret vs. the Connestgo, 2 
\Vall Jr. 116, 16 Federal 716, 718. And see Words and 
Phrases. Vol. 39, page 497. 
\Vhat the respondents are really asking for is for this 
Court to re-in-stall them in office for the law which they 
failed to confon11 to was both mandatory and self execut-
ing. They now ask this Court to make them officers de 
jure with all the powers that such officers have. Need 
we say anything more on this phase of the case? 
POINT 2. REPLY TO RESPONDENTS POINT 2 
"TII:\T PETITIONER HAS NO LEGAL AUTHORITY 
TO BRING THIS ACTION." 
The answer to point 2 of respondeJ?.tS brief is that by 
and through said (b) ( 1) under d, 65B, petitioner is 
given the right to bring this action. 
lT nder this Rule a person claiming a public office in 
himself would be the party to bring the action. Under the 
old common law he evidently could not do this and it 
was only under Rule 104-66-5, Vol. 6, pp. 631, Utah Code 
:\nnotated 1943 that he was so allowed and under that 
Rule he had to bring it in the name of the state. Under 
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the present rule he may bring it in his own name and 
without security for costs. However, we do not proceed 
under this rule, but under the rule which says that a 
person may bring action upon any other ground set forth 
in subdivision (b) ( 1) of that rule, only if the Attorney-
General fails to do so after notice. The words ANY 
OTHER means that not only may a private party bring 
the action if he claims the office on that ground for him-
self but in ADDITION to that ground he may bring 
action if any person usurps or unlawfully holds and exer-
cises said office as where he has forfeited the same. Al1 
he seeks is the enforcement of 10-6-18. Not only have 
we been authorized by this Rule here discussed, but have 
the consent of the Attorney General as can easily be 
gathered from the exhibits in our petition for an Extra-
ordinary Writ. In the case of First National Bank and 
Trust Co. of Port Chester vs. New York Title and Insur-
ance Company 12 N.Y.S. (2) 703, 709, 171 Misc. 854, 
wherein it is held that: a "permit" in one sense connotes 
something less than consent, but in another sense may 
mean an authorization, it may mean consent, and may 
mean grant, to give leave. 
About the case of State vs. Christensen, 84, Ut. 183, 
35P. ( 2) 775, cited by petitioner - it was only cited by 
petitioner for the purpose of showing that statute on which 
the defense was based was mandatory in nature and self-
executing as is 10-6-18. It was a case where a party 
claimed the office for himself. It would seem that the 
rule which we contend gives petitioner the right to pro-
ceed was spawned or brought about by the case of State 
vs. Elliot 13 Utah 200, 44 P. 248. 
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Point :l REPLY TO RESPONDENTS PLEA OF 
"I,:\( :l-IES." 
Under point 3 respondents discuss laches and seek 
to maintain that there was laches. In this we disagree. 
\lay wc say that the Oregon case mentioned is based on 
facts and law entirely different from the instant case as 
is the other case cited as may be gathered from our pre-
vious briefs and it would serve no useful purpose to re-
pt•at. And we further point to our argument in this bliei 
as further reply to this point of laches as also the previous 
hrid and typewritten brief. We know of no case where 
"bchcs" is either pleadable or provable against the en-
forcement of a public law such as 10-6-18. See United 
States vs. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. U.S. Wash. 61 S.C. 264, 
:2S:3. And see Words and Phrases Vol. 24 pp. 79 and 
\'ol. 15 page 265. Before we leave this subject we would 
ask this: Suppose that respondents failure to publish had 
not been discovered until 3 years after their qualification 
or had been discovered within 3 months and action im-
mediately brought upon such discoveries, would the re-
spondents still plead "laches." Of course not, if they 
follow common reason and logic. Yet the result to the 
respondents and public would be the same as if there 
had been a lapse of time in bringing action after such dis-
cm·er~·· "Laches" is not mere delay in bringing action, 
but delay inducing change of position of defendants or 
injuriously affecting his legal rights." Shea vs Shea 4 
X.E. ( 2) 1015, 1018. In what way was the position· of 
respondents or the public altered to detriment of either 
by the alleged laches. None at all. The public wants the 
law upheld, and we ask what could be more important 
than that? 
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REPLY TO RESPONDENTS "CONCLUSION" 
In respondents conclusion they say that the Act of 
1917 repealed "all other conflicting Acts," but they fail to 
point out any conflict. And Sutherland Statutory Con-
struction Vol 1, pp. 466, Sec. 2013 says: "An express 
general repealing clause to the effect that all inconsistant 
enactments are repealed, is in legal contemplation a nul-
ity." We maintain that the Act of 1917 did not repeal 
10-6-18, but if it did then it has been re-enacted again 
and again and we do not believe it can be successfully 
charged that this statute has been inadvertantly left in 
the Code when we consider upon whom the legislature 
relies in the formation of these statutes. 
We believe that one of the purposes of this statute 
requiring publication within 30 days after qualification 
was and is that inasmuch as all appointments are generally 
made within the first 30 days after an administration takes 
office that the people be informed as to who contributed 
to the campaign of the officers elected. Being so informed, 
the public would be alerted to see if there was any im-
proper connection between those who contributed and 
appointments. 
We believe it would really be "news" if the legislature 
and those on whom they rely be informed they have been 
so negligent as respondents infer and for a period of 50 
years. 
Counsel in his conclusion, discusses the right of peti-
tioner to bring this action. We believe we have sufficently 
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ri( 
ve~ 
answered this in the previous brief, the typewritten brief 
and this one and ask the Court to consider these in con-
rwction with this point so we do not repeat. 
The fact remains that respondents are not even de 
facto officers and have no right to act as Mayor and Com-
missioner of Logan City in making contracts and in gen-
eral have no right to carry on the city's business and sub-
mit they should be ousted as Mayor and Commissioner 
of Logan City. 
Dated this 9th day of April, 1964. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Harvey A. Sjostrom 
375 West Center Street 
Logan, Utah 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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